When Bank of England (and the Federal Reserve Board) introduced their quantitative easing (QE) operations they emphasised the effects on money and credit, but much of their empirical research on the effects of QE focuses on long-term interest rates. We use a flow of funds matrix with an independent central bank to show the implications of QE and other monetary developments, and argue that the financial crisis, the fiscal expansion and QE are likely to have constituted major exogenous shocks to money and credit in the UK which could not be digested immediately by the usual adjustment mechanisms. We present regressions of a reduced form model which considers the growth of nominal spending as determined by the growth of nominal money and other variables. These results suggest that money was not important during the Great Moderation but has had a much larger role in the period of the crisis and QE. We then use these estimates to illustrate the effects of the financial crisis and QE. We conclude that it would be useful to incorporate money and/or credit in wider macroeconometric models of the UK economy.
The original announcement of the decision to start quantitative easing (QE) in the UK put it in the context of "the aim of boosting the supply of money and credit and thus raising the rate of growth of nominal spending". In the US, the equivalent announcement presented it as a decision "to help improve conditions in private credit markets".
1 Policymakers in each country were also surely well aware of the argument (set out in Friedman and Schwartz, 1960 ) that the money supply had been allowed to fall too far in the early 1930s (von Hagen, 2009 ).
However, the first substantial pieces of research to come out of the Bank of England (BoE) and the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) focused on the effect of large scale asset purchases on long term bond yields, and made almost no reference to money or credit.
Gagnon, Raskin, Remache and Sack (2010) used event study and time-series analysis and found that yields on US long term Treasury bonds fell in response to large scale asset purchases by 50-100 basis points (in the event study) or 38-82 bps (in the timeseries analysis). Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens and Tong (2010) also used event study and time-series analysis, and found falls in yields on UK gilts of 50-100 bps. Only later did the Bank of England publish articles or papers examining either the effects of QE on broad money or the effects of QE on nominal spending or real economic activity (Bridges, Rossiter and Thomas, 2011; Joyce et al, 2011; Kapetanios, et al., 2012; Bridges and Thomas, 2012) .
This paper seeks to investigate whether the growth of broad money might be able to help us to understand the nature of the financial crisis and the effects of QE. In a sense, it takes its cue from Goodhart (2007 Goodhart ( , see also 2010 , who argued that the neglect of money in the dominant New Keynesian and Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models (Woodford, 2003) -based on assumptions about money demand stability and money supply endogeneity -had been taken too far. The quantity of credit has also recently been emphasised by Driffill and Miller (2011) , who have used the model of Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) to argue that the fall in that quantity was a key factor in the crisis.
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In the next section we use the once well-known flow of funds framework to discuss the mechanics of financial crisis, fiscal expansion and QE. In section 2 we look at the relevant data for the UK over the last 3-4 years. In section 3 we report the results of a simple reduced-form regression of the relationship between nominal spending growth and nominal money growth using interacted dummies for the crisis period. In sections 4 and 5 we illustrate the striking results of that regression by using appropriate
counterfactuals to consider what they imply, first for the contribution of the financial crisis to the path of spending in 2008-9, and then for the contribution of (the first round of) QE in 2009-10. Section 6 concludes by arguing that this investigation should be taken further by the introduction of monetary and/or credit aggregates in some form into existing large-scale macroeconometric models of the UK.
The mechanics of crisis and quantitative easing
Here we present a simple analysis of the 'mechanics' of financial crisis and QE in terms of a flow of funds matrix (Table 1) of the kind which used to be included in undergraduate macro textbooks (e.g. Artis and Lewis, 1991; Cobham, 1998) but is not familiar to the younger generation of macro researchers.
In Table 1 behaviour. However, this framework is useful because it obliges us to think through the ramifications of any change: a change in one sector's acquisition of a financial claim must involve some offsetting change in that column and in that row, and typically some further changes as well.
[ Table 1 near here, circa 1/2 of page]
The identities in the table can be manipulated (and this was often the main purpose of the exercise in the past) so as to derive the counterparts to broad money growth:
where Ms is broad money supply, DEF is the government's budget deficit, GD nf is the amount of government debt held by the private non-financial sector, A is banks' lending (advances) to the private non-financial sector, NDL is banks' non-deposit liabilities (mainly equity issued by the banks) and RES is the central bank (CB)'s foreign exchange reserves. This is broadly the credit counterparts to monetary growth as identified, for example, in Table A3 .2 of the Bank of England's Bankstats. 5 But the flow of funds as a whole goes beyond that insofar as it represents the balance sheet constraints of the non-bank sectors as well.
We now consider through this framework the proximate effects of a number of exogenous changes, as summarised in table 2; the changes discussed are restricted to simple cases where there are 'single-factor' offsets, and the analysis focuses on firstround effects and ignores subsequent portfolio adjustments (many of which take place within the private non-financial sector). The first three rows of Table 2 are clear enough, but the later rows deserve some comments.
6
[ Table 2 near here, probably whole page in landscape]
Row 4 treats the case of a conventional fiscal expansion financed by a bond issue:
there is an increase in the government's budget deficit G-T to which we assume there is a corresponding fall in the private sector's deficit I-S (and no change in the current account X-Z), together with an issue of bonds by the government. In this simple case the private non-financial sector 'spends' the additional resources from its increased savings/reduced investment on buying the new government bonds. There is no change in H or Ms.
Row 5 considers a 'pure' financial crisis in which banks cut their lending to the private non-financial sector. For both sectors the reduction in bank lending is balanced by a reduction in deposits. The result is that H is unchanged but Ms falls.
Row 6 is for 'pure' quantitative easing: the CB goes into the market and buys government bonds from the private non-financial sector. By the time the CB's cheque has passed through the payments system, this brings about an increase in both the deposits of the private non-financial sector and the reserves of the commercial banks.
For the CB the rise in its assets (increased bond holdings) is balanced by the rise in its liabilities in the form of banks' reserves, for the banks the rise in their assets (reserves) is balanced by a rise in their deposit liabilities, and for the private non-financial sector the fall in bond holdings is balanced by a rise in another asset, their bank deposits.
The result is that H and Ms both rise.
Row 7 combines a financial crisis/fall in bank lending (as in row 5) with a fiscal expansion (as in row 4) of the same magnitude. The private non-financial sector ends up with more bonds (to the extent of the fall in its financial deficit), less loans and less deposits. The result, which is the sum of the results for rows 4 and 5, is that H is unchanged but Ms falls.
Row 8 combines the financial crisis with QE (as in row 6) of the same magnitude:
here banks' lending falls but the CB steps in to buy government bonds to the same amount, and its purchase of bonds from the private non-financial sector offsets the impact of the fall in banks' lending on the private non-financial sector's bank deposits.
For the banks there is a fall in one asset (loans) offset by a rise in another (reserves at the CB). The overall effect (the sum of the effects in rows 5 and 6) is that H rises but Ms is unchanged.
Finally, row 9 combines fiscal expansion with QE of the same magnitude. Here the government issues bonds to cover its increased budget deficit, and these bonds are in effect bought by the private non-financial sector (the independent CB is not allowed to participate in the primary government debt market) but then sold immediately to the CB. Thus the private non-financial sector, which has a reduced financial deficit (corresponding to the increased government budget deficit) ends up with a rise in its deposits, while for the banks the increase in deposit liabilities is balanced by a rise in reserves at the CB. In total (combining the results of rows 4 and 6), Ms rises (because deposits rise) and H rises (because banks' reserves rise). This is, in effect, the standard case of a monetary-financed fiscal expansion.
The key point to take from this discussion is that QE raises the money supply, either absolutely (rows 6 and 9) or relative to what would have happened otherwise (row 8).
In section 4 we also make use of the results that banks' issues of new equity tend to reduce money (row 2), while banks' acquisitions of government debt tend to increase it (row 3).
Monetary growth in the UK 2007-10
It would be useful to fill in the actual numbers for a full flow of funds matrix in recent years to examine the evolution of the various aggregates in the UK. But once we move from the simple framework above to the specificities of the UK the matrix becomes much more complicated, because of the role of foreign financial institutions, the larger number of financial claims and the deep international integration of the UK financial sector (foreign sector purchases of government bonds, domestic banks' operations in foreign currency, and so on). However, we can provide numbers for various aggregates and for the basic credit counterparts so as to highlight the major developments in financial flows since 2007. [ Table 3 near here, probably a whole page in landscape, but half a page in portrait if possible; Figure 2 also near here, this may need to be a whole page in landscape, but half a page in portrait if it is still clear enough]
The penultimate row in the table shows the numbers available (for M4 rather than Bell and Young (2010) of the balance between credit supply side factors and loan demand factors finds that credit supply effects were dominant, that is banks were deciding to lend less. 11 And QE itself was the result of a policy decision taken by the MPC (in coordination with the government) in the light of the crisis and the recession. These changes are not, therefore, the automatic response of the monetary system to the shocks affecting it, they were the result of specific decisions taken by specific agents (who could have taken different decisions). In that sense these changes can be regarded as exogenous to the monetary system. Moreover, they are substantial enough not to be washed away in the short term through the usual adjustment mechanisms that allow monetary growth in more tranquil periods to be reasonably viewed as endogenous.
This suggests that it would be useful to investigate whether we can use broad money directly (in a reduced form equation) to analyse the course of UK GDP over the crisis. Q4, so we use the four-quarter growth rate of M4 as broad money growth before 1998
Q4. Figure 1 above shows the four quarter growth rates of nominal GDP and nominal money on this basis, together with the corresponding growth rate for real GDP. The independent variables we consider are lagged nominal GDP growth, the annual growth rate of the world commodity price index, Bank Rate and nominal money growth. We consider up to 4 lags of each variable.
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Since, as set out in the previous section, there is a suspicion that money may have been subject to extraordinary supply-side shocks in the last few years which might have changed the underlying relationships, we estimate this equation with interacted dummy variables for M4 growth and Bank rate: the dummy is defined as zero up to 2007 Q2 and 1 thereafter, and it is interacted with each of the four lags of these two variables.
The results of the regression are reported in the first column of Table 4 . For the period as a whole, the automatic selection programme in PC-Give selects only the lagged dependent variable (lagged one period), nominal money growth (lagged three periods) with a rather small but significant coefficient, and commodity price inflation (lagged three periods), but not Bank Rate. However, the interacted dummy variables covering only the period from 2007 Q3 turn out to be very important: money growth (lagged two periods) has a significant coefficient of 0.70, and Bank Rate (lagged four periods) has a significant coefficient of -1.49. This coefficient on monetary growth is less than the 1 that might be expected from a simple quantity theory model (with constant velocity), but given the medium rather than long-term focus of the analysis it is impressively large. The coefficient on lagged Bank Rate is also strikingly high: it implies that a rise of 1% in Bank Rate leads in four quarters to a 1.49% fall in the rate of nominal GDP growth. The lags -given that money growth is since four quarters before -are broadly consistent with a priori expectations and, in the case of Bank Rate, with the Bank of England's BEQM model.
[ Table 4 near here, c. 1/2 of page]
The exercise is repeated in equation [2] for real GDP growth against real M4 growth.
The latter is calculated using the GDP deflator, so the conversion is the same as for Overall, these results are consistent with the proposition that money has a significant role in explaining nominal spending growth in the periods which include the crisis and QE, but little such role in the tranquil pre-crisis period; and they are consistent with Goodhart's (2007) argument that money may sometimes provide no additional useful information beyond that provided by inflation, output and interest rates, but in other periods money might tell us more, so that in general it should be monitored rather than ignored. In the next two sections we use the results of regression [ Table 5 
The effect on nominal income of QE
We now turn to assess the impact of quantitative easing on nominal GDP growth,
given the occurrence of the financial crisis, by constructing a counterfactual path for monetary growth. Given the complexity of the issue and the various offsets to QE which have been identified by Bridges et al. (2011) (see also Bridges and Thomas, 2012) , we construct three different counterfactuals (see also Second, there is an important offset highlighted by Bridges et al. (2011) : the effect of 'banking sector stabilisation' in the form of (a) banks' issuance of new equity and bonds which raises their non-deposit liabilities and reduces their deposits (see row 2
in Table 2 ), and (b) banks' acquisition of additional public sector debt in order to improve their liquidity ratios, which increases their deposits (see row 3 of Table 2 ). It is likely that some banking sector stabilisation of these kinds would have occurred in the absence of QE, since banks needed to improve their capital ratios after the revelation of large housing-related bad debts. But it could be argued that the stabilisation was facilitated by QE: QE meant that 'other financial corporations' (OFCs), notably pension funds and life assurance companies, which had sold their gilts to the BoE now had extra resources to invest, and this may have encouraged banks to issue new paper. We therefore construct a counterfactual C under which A recent article in the Bank's Quarterly Bulletin (Joyce et al. 2011) has reported a number of estimates of the peak effect of QE on real GDP and CPI inflation taken from ongoing research at the Bank: the range for GDP is 1.5-2%, and that for CPI inflation is 0.75-1.5%. If we take the sum of these to be a reasonable estimate of the change in nominal GDP, this comes to around 3%. In Figure 10 , the difference in the four quarter nominal GDP growth rates as of 2010 Q1 (the QE period) between the predicted rate and the rate on counterfactual D (which implies the smallest impact of QE) is also of the order of 3%, while the differences with counterfactuals C and B are around 4.8% and 10.6%. On the other hand, our corresponding estimates of the peak effects are 4.6 and 7.2% for the four quarters to 2010 Q2 on counterfactuals D and C, and 18.2% for 2010 Q3 on counterfactual B. Thus our estimates for the effect of QE are typically a little higher than those reported by the Bank, particularly if the 'true'
counterfactual is agreed to be somewhere between B and D, as argued above.
Conclusions
Formal announcements of the introduction of quantitative easing emphasised the intended impact on money and credit and hence on nominal spending, but the main empirical research published by the leading QE-undertaking central banks focuses instead on the effects of QE on long-term interest rates rather than money or credit. In this paper we have tried to see whether there is a direct connection between nominal spending growth and monetary growth, which we argue is very likely to have been significantly affected by the financial crisis and quantitative easing. Our approach can be thought of as covering the range of possible transmission mechanisms, as set out in e.g. Benford et al. (2009) , and connecting money with the object of ultimate interest, nominal spending, rather than say long-term interest rates. The results we have obtained should be treated as tentative, since they have been derived using a simple ad hoc reduced form equation rather than a more comprehensive model, and since we can only give a range of counterfactuals on different assumptions. Nevertheless, they suggest strongly that changes in money have had a considerable impact on the economy in the last few years, and a much greater impact than in the pre-crisis period. This is consistent with the idea that in tranquil times money may not embody significant additional information, but that in other periods changes in banks' behaviour may affect money, credit, nominal spending and the real economy.
Moreover, they imply that QE has indeed had a major impact on the UK economy, and a somewhat larger impact on our analysis than that reported by the Bank of England.
For this period at least broad money would indeed appear to tell us something, enough to suggest that more research would be appropriate. We do not think further insights can be gained by working on simple reduced form models, but we suggest that operators of large macroeconometric models of the UK economy, notably the Bank of 
Notes: G-T, X-Z (Z for imports) and I-S are the standard sectoral financial deficits as in the national income accounts; D and NDL are bank deposits and bank non-deposit liabilities respectively; H, C and R are high-powered money, notes and coin in circulation and banks' reserves at the central bank; GD, GD cb , GD nf and GD f are the stock of government debt (securities) in existence, and the amounts held by the central bank, private non-financial and private financial sectors respectively; CBL is short term lending from central bank to commercial banks, i.e. 'money market assistance'; A is bank lending (advances); K is capital inflows, and RES is the foreign exchange reserves. The change in high-powered money is equal to the change in notes and coin in circulation (∆C) plus the change in banks' reserves at the central bank (∆R). The change in broad money is equal to the change in notes and coin in circulation (∆C) plus the change in deposits (∆D). 
